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SYSTEM RELIABILITY MATHEMATICAL MODELING
Lee R. Webster
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION
of
FAIRCHILD KILLER CORPORATION
Bladensburg, Md.

INTRODUCTION

MODEL CONSTRUCTION

The reliability mathematical model of a
system is the basis of all reliability pre
dictions, optimization, apportionment, and
virtually all other system reliability analyses.
Because of the importance of the math model,
maximum care should be taken in its construction.
A system reliability model is defined here as a
probability expression which represents the actual
system configuration such that when the relia
bilities of the system elements are known along
with certain other mission parameter values, the
expression can be used to calculate the overall
system mission reliability. The complexity of
the model structure depends upon the complexity
of the system it represents and upon the degree
of accuracy used in approximating the actual
system configuration. The well known series
model, wherein the system reliability is given
by the product of all the constituent element
reliabilities is the simplest type. The accuracy
of the series model will generally tend to be
very high if the failure of any constituent
element will cause the failure of the system of
interest. However, more complex model types are
required in order to accurately represent a
system containing a relatively large number of
alternate paths or modes of operation.

Mathematical Tools
In a large majority of modeling situations,
systems can be broken up into series or seriesparallel combinations. The system reliability
math model in these cases is constructed using
one or more of a family of fairly widely known
probability expressions and techniques. There
are some configurations, however, which can not
be expressed as combinations of series and/or
parallel terms and therefore require more complex
and somewhat less popular techniques. The follow
ing is a brief summary of the more widely used
and fundamental procedures used in reliability
math modeling.
Series
The simplest system model is the series config
uration. In this model the system is represented
as a chain and the total reliability is the product
of all the individual element or link reliabilities.
Thus, it is assumed that the failure of any element
or link causes system failure and that system rel
iability is directly related to system complexity.
For any given system and set of element failure rates,
the value of system reliability which is predicted
using a series model will be the minimum possible
value and thus the most conservative. Because of
the above, "parts count" reliability estimates are
often used for making "ballpark" or "first cut"
estimates of the reliability of a system.

SUMMARY
This paper discusses the general procedures
and considerations involved in the construction
and improvement of system reliability models.
Specific points covered include the performance
of supporting operations analyses; the utili
zation of the system block diagrams and the
failure mode and effect analysis in generating
the system reliability diagram; and a summary
of many of the more widely used mathematical
tools used to transform the system function
diagram into a system reliability expression.

Redundancy
When it becomes necessary to account for redundant
system elements, various elements states, or alter
nate modes of system operation, the system math model
becomes more complex. Before one can generate the
reliability expression for redundant elements, it
must be determined whether the back up elements are
operating "on line" along with the main element or
if they are on standby duty to be used only in the
event of failure of the main element.

The application of the procedure discussed
is demonstrated on the Power Control and Con
version Assemblies of the Advanced Orbiting
Solar Observatory (AOSO).

Functional Redundancy- When only one of a group
of elements, simultaneously operating in parallel is
needed, the total reliability for the group is one
minus the product of the element unreliabilities.*

The AOSO Power Conversion and Control
Assemblies are a portion of a project being
performed for NASA by the Fairchild Killer
Electronics and Information Systems Division.
These assemblies contain a large number of
alternate operating modes and series-parallel
situations which are used to satisfy an extremely
high reliability requirement. These redundancy
provisions plus a number of important but
unknown quantities and other mission parameters,
all of which must be taken into account, make
the power control and conversion assemblies
excellent examples for demonstrating the appli
cation of a wide variety, of math modeling
techinques.

-Note: This result neglects possible increases in
element failure rates caused by increased loading
resulting from the failure of other elements. This
is one result of the assumption of statistical
independence made for all elements throughout this
paper unless otherwise specified.
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R = 1 -

7T

Where:
(3

Where:
R = total reliability of the group
of redundant elements.

= base of the natural log system

A = the failure rate of each of the n elements

<fy. = the unreliability of the i th
element
1

~L = mission time

n = number of elements in parallel

If the operating and the non-operating standby
elements have different reliabilities, the total
reliability for the group requires the integration of
the joint density function of the combination. This
is a very general procedure being applicable regardless
if the elements are equal or if they have exponential
reliability functions. In cases where the element
reliability functions are exponential, the density
is given as:
function £t

Similarly, if all the elements have equal
reliabilities, the group reliability R, then
becomes:
/TV

R = 1 - Ou

This last result is also obtained from
expansion of

For two different elements having failure rates
the density functions are
\ ,
X | and
respectively,

where
JTL - the reliability of each of the i
elements

> e' Ajtt

n = the total number of parallel elements
As before % is the probability of all
is the probability
n units failing and /— jLof at least one unit operating, i.e. the group
reliability.

where:

Many times it becomes necessary to account
for differences in element failure modes. For
example, if an element can fail only as an open
circuit and if n are arranged as in Figure 1,
the group reliability is found from the pre
viously given expression

t{

= time of failure of element number 1

L!

= time of failure of element number 2 = £.
= mission time

u

R = i - V"

The probability of both elements failing in an in-,
is the
finitely small time interval t> t t+• &tr
product of the two density functions. Integrating this
= mission time, ^9
to t,
product from fct ~ O
for
obtains the joint density function, p(.t)
the two element combination in terms of the single variable

If, however, the above elements are arranged
in series, the group reliability becomes J&
since the opening of any one element causes the
whole group to fail. Similarly then, it can
be seen that if elements which fail only as
short circuits»are arranged per figure 1, the
since the
group reliability becomes A/1*'
shorting of any one element results in total
group failure. Thus, it follows by placing
elements which fail only by shorting in series
the group reliability is given by:

tt -0

again looking at the exponential use this result is

The integration of this result, with respect to time
from t to infinity is the summation of all possible
combinations of the time of failure for elements 1 and 2
which result in the system failing after mission time "t
, for the
and is therefore the combined reliability R
two element arrangement (again neglecting switching rel
iability) ,

Sequential Redundancy - When only one of a
group identical elements is in use while the
remainder are in a non-operating stand-by status
waiting to be switched in one by one upon failure
of the operating element, the total reliability
is given by
(neglecting switching reliability)

R

and for the exponential case
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Functional and Sequential Redundancy Combinations
Other types of redundancy which are variations of
the sequential and/or functional type are given in
Table I. Also included in the table are reference
sources which provide more complete information on
the derivation of the probability models listed.
Bayes 1 Theorem- Occasionally a system config
uration will be encountered in which the elements
are not arranged in series or combinations of func
tional or sequential redundancy.
One example of such a case would be a config
uration such as shown in Figure 2. In- this system,
the successful or operating states which are pos
sible are AB, CB, CD, and ED. Thus, unlike the
redundancy configuration on Figure 3, the combi
nations AD and EB are not possible. Bayes 'Theorem
states that if I is an event which depends upon
one of two mutually exclusive events, H and J, of
which one must necessarily occur, then the proba
bility of the occurence of I is given by

Applying Bayes 1 Theorem to block C of the
system in Figure 2, the following can be stated:

it is a considerable task to define such a basic concept
as system or mission success.
The system reliability block diagram should be
constructed as early as possible in the evolution of
the system configuration. This will permit the analyst
to give full consideration to design audit and failure
mode and effect analysis data in up dating the con
struction of the math model. By virtue of the increased
accuracy of the math model and its availability early
in the project,the reliability engineer is in a position
to not only more realistically monitor the quality of
the design job but also to provide design engineering
with better analytical support for design improvement
and optimization which will be discussed later.
Returning to the engine starting problem, Figure 6
shows an improved reliability block diagram which
includes failure mode and effect analysis data. In
this diagram it can be seen that the manual crank is
effective only if the starter and/or solenoid has
failed open, and if the battery has been discharged
less than 70%. This shows that the probability of at
least turning the engine over either electrically or
manually during the starting process is less than unity
which is implied in Figure 5.
System Reliability Math Model

System Reliability Diagram
Simply stated, the reliability diagram is a
schematic representation of the system functions
and subfunctions combined in a probability sense
rather than signal flow. The system reliability
diagram serves as a basis for making the transistion
from the system functional block diagram to the
system reliability math model. This is because the
math model is merely mathematical expression for the
logic implicit in the reliability diagram. A typical
reliability diagram is generated in the following
example: Figure 4 is a signal flow or functional
block diagram of an engine starting circuit for an
automobile. Figure 5 is the reliability diagram of
the same system. Although a number of elements in
Figure 4 are wired in parallel, in a reliability
sense all these elements are in series since they
are all needed to start the engine.
The simplicity of the reliability diagrams in
the above example is the exception rather than the
rule.
Nearly all reliability diagrams
(and math models) are approximations. As
such, the two essential characteristics of
the system reliability diagram are that it
be sufficiently representative of the system
operation and that it not be so complicated as
to make the resulting math model unusable.
The satisfaction of both of the requirements be
comes increasingly difficult as the system
complexity increases and requires considerable
interplay of the system design engineering,
operations analysis, and reliability engineer
ing disciplines. In many instances, for example,

After the reliability block diagram has been
generated, the system reliability math model is con
structed by utilizing a variety of mathematical tools
and probability expressions, such as surveyed earlier,
to develop and combine expressions for subassembly
and/or subfunction reliabilities. When these subassembly and/ or subfunction reliabilities are quantized,
the model can be solved to predict system reliability.
MODEL USE
Although the system reliability math model is
probably most widely used for performing reliability
predictions, there are a number of other important
applications which can be made in an efficient, modern
reliability program. These additional applications
include design reliability optimization, system effective
ness analysis, and technical management decision making.
Design Reliability Optimization
The function of optimizing the reliability of a
design is defined here to be the selection of that system
configuration, from the family of all possible con
figurations which are acceptable for a given task,
which has optimum values of reliability and other system
parameters such as weight, cost, etc. In general,
there are two types of reliability optimization problems.
Problem Type I. In what is called here a type I
problem, a system reliability requirement is specified
and it is desired to obtain a system configuration
which just satisfies this requirement and which also
satisfies other constraints which may be stated or
implied. An example would be to configure a system
such that it has a 90% reliability, a maximum weight of
100 Ibs., and a minimum cost.
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Problem Type II. The second type problem is
essentially the reverse of Type I. The objective
in this problem is to configure a system which has
the maximum reliability possible while still satis
fying all other specified constraints. Such as
maximum levels of weight, volume, and cost.
There are a number of optimization procedures
available and undoubtedly many improvements are
forthcoming as a result of the increasing research
activity in this area. The use of one of these
methods will be briefly demonstrated herein on a
portion of a satellite power system.
System E ffe ctiveness Ana 1 ysis
By including system deployment variables such
as maintainability, down times, etc., into the
construction of the reliability math model, a
figure of merit for system effectiveness is obtained.

Operations and System Analysis- In order to better
define the existing system configuration and the mission
requirements for the two assemblies, extensive operations
and system analyses were undertaken.
System Analysis- In analyzing the system, reliability
and design engineers concentrated primarily on the
completion of a preliminary failure mode and effect
analysis (FMEA). This analysis established the cause,
type, and probability of occurence of subassembly
failure and determined the consequences of these failures
to the operation of the two assemblies with respect to
degradation of output and to the availability of alter
nate modes of operation. In addition, the system was
also broken up into specific functions which were defined,
classified, and related to appropriate circuitry and/or
subsystems.
The results of the system analysis included such
items as the following:

Performing design reliability optimization
analyses with the inclusion of deployment variables
information then implies the derivation of a system
configuration having an optimum or maximum effective
ness.

1.

The functions of taper (high rate Charging)
and trickle (low rate charging) of the satellite
batteries by the control assembly were identi
fied and the conditions under which each can be
performed were determined.

Technical Management Decision Making

2.

The actual redundancy in the solar paddle
deployment squid firing circuits of the control
assembly was determined,

3.

Since the non-operating standby battery has a
predictable loss of charge rate under open circuit
conditions at the design ambient temperature,
the trickle Charging of the standby battery
need only be supplied for the first 7792 hours
of the mission.

If the reliability math modeling process is
begun early and kept current throughout the R & D
effort, it is a relatively simple task to utilize
the model to obtain information very useful in
directing engineering effort, design emphasis, and
system philosophy. Relatively minor analyses can
be performed during preliminary design in order to
competitively evaluate alternate system philosophies,
identify reliability limitations posed by state of
the art requirements, and having selected a system
philosophy, to design both a reliability and a
development program plan. During the progress of
the development effort, the same type of analysis
as performed above will assist in isolating and
assessing requirements for shifts in engineering
effort and/or emphasis.
Reliability Model for AOSO Power Control and
Conversion Assemblies
Problem

Operations Analysis, This effort consisted of the
AOSO mission requirements to determine the more specific
mission requirements for the power conversion and
control assemblies. In addition, there was a joint
effort with the AOSO prime contractor to perform a
failure mode of operation study. This study was an
overall AOSO system investigation into what type of
assembly failures actually caused mission abort.
(This is a different goal than for the failure mode
and effect analysis performed during the system analysis
which considered performance outside of assembly
specification limits as a failure).
The results of these studies included the following:

The reliability mathematical model construction
and use techniques are demonstrated in the following
discussion of the AOSO (Advanced Orbiting Solar
Observatory) power control and power conversion
assemblies. The specified mission for AOSO is a
70% reliability for one year of orbital operation.
The apportioned reliability requirements for the
power conversion and control assemblies for the one
year mission are 94.3% and 97.1% respectively.
There is an additional requirement of a 0.915 rel
iability for the combination of both assemblies.

1.

Reliability calculations should be based on a
mission time of 8800 hours instead of 8760 in
order to account for the increased environ
mental severity during launch.

2.

Although only one battery is needed for operation,
thus leaving the remaining battery as a nonoperating standby unit, the mission of the con
version and control assembly must be able to
maintain either battery at full charge for one
year. Thus, the redundancy advantage is taken
into account in the overall AOSO system analysis.

3.

Due to the more or less linear decay (caused by
radiation) of the power generating capabilities
of the solar paddles with respect to time, the
solar array voltage limiter is actually needed
only for approximately the first 4000 hours of
the one year flight.

Model Construction
First Estimate- The "first cut" or "ball park"
reliability estimate of the subject assemblies was
based strictly upon a parts count prediction.
Although the resulting predicted reliability value
of 0.51% was comparatively low, it was also obvious
that the use of the series model or parts count
approach was too conservative and th#t a number of
mission parameters needed to be quantized.
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The results
System Reliability Diagram
of the operations and system analyses described
above were used in the first attempt to construct
the reliability block diagram of the conversion
and control assemblies (Figures 7, 8, 9.)

The taper charge mode of the Backup Charger
is assumed to be useable only when the Taper
Charger has failed or when the power control
assembly is in the emergency mode of operation.
The trickle charge mode of the Backup Charger
is used to replace the failed Trickle Charger
only if the Taper Charger has not failed.
In addition, it is assumed that both the
Trickle and Taper Charging modes of the backup
charger have the same failure rate.

Figure 7 merely shows the series relation
ship between the control and conversion assem
blies, i.e. both are needed for mission success.
Figures 8 and 9 are reliability diagrams
of the power control assembly and the battery
charge regulation function of the control
assembly, respectively. No figure -is included
for the power conversion assembly since, during
this phase of the AOSO Program, it was simply
a series string of assemblies as will be
described later.

The Backup Charger is assumed to have a
non-operating standby failure rate equal
to zero.
Ambient battery temperatures are assumed to
be equal to the maximum design temperature of
110 F for purposes of deriving the period of
time required by a fully charged battery to
lose 50% of its charge, while on non-operating
standby and open circuit conditions.

System Reliability Math Model In develop
ing the mathematical models for the power con
version and control assemblies, the following
assumptions and conditions are made:
1.

Ambient power control and power conversion
assembly temperatures are assumed to be 150°F.

The power control assembly requirement
is interpreted as follows:

All elements are assumed to have an exponential
reliability distribution.

The power control assembly shall
have a 97.1% probability of main
taining a full charge on a speci
fied Operating Battery and a
Standby Battery for a mission
duration of 8800 hours, (note that
this provision neglects the fact
that the batteries are redundant
by essentially stating that both
are needed.)
2.

The failure of a State of Charge
Monitor is assumed to result in an
open, such that the associated battery
must be utilized in the circuit through
an alternate route.
If the original Operating Battery loses
80% of its charge as indicated by its
state of charge monitor, or has a
State of Charge Monitor failure, it is
replaced by the Standby Battery.
Emergency mode .operation is initiated
whenever both batteries are below 50%
of charge. It is assumed that the
emergency mode merely provides the
system, upon ground command switching,
with the capability that either charger
can be used to charge either of the
two batteries on the line (See Figure 9)
Time consumed in having to recharge
dead batteries and problems in removing
(if required) catastrophically failed
units from the line are not considered.

3.

The definitions of taper and trickle
charge used herein are somewhat broader
than the usual technical definitions.
Essentially, taper charging is used to
designate a high charge rate as opposed
to trickle charging which is that charge
rate used to maintain a full charge on
the Standby Battery. Thus, the battery
charge regulation function is said to
contain one Taper Charger, one Trickle
Charger, and a Backup Charger which has
a taper charge mode and a trickle charge
mode.

10.

Only "on board" electronics and/or systems are
considered. Ground based equipments, signal
conditioning circuits, and human inputs are
neglected.

11.

The reliability of the switching functions
shown as items (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), and
(12) in Figure 9 is assumed to be independent
of time and refers to a single switchover
operation.

12.

The life of a State of Charge Monitor is
small compared to the life of a battery.

13.

Modes of degraded system operation, such as
those employing the trickle charger when
the taper and backup chargers have failed,
are not considered.

14.

The advantages of making more than one change
between primary and backup charge modes are
not considered,

15.

At least one source of trickle charge is re
quired for the standby battery from start
of mission to 7792 hours.

16.

No provision is made for epoxy covered solder
connections,

Power Con,tro 1. Assemb 1 y - Figure 8 is the relia
bility diagram, for the four functions performed by
the power control assembly. As shown in Figure 8
the Power Control Assembly will satisfy its mission
r e q u i r erne; n t s i f:
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1)

The hold-off function is performed properly
prior to and at the initiation of launch.

2}

The paddle deployment function is satisfactorily
completed when initiated.

3)

The battery charge regulation function is
performed for one year, and

4)

The solar array voltage limiter function is
satisfactorily performed for one year.

If
fails,
Ground
If the
Charge
fail;

Referring to Figure 8, the expression
for the reliability, R(PCA), of the Power
Control Assembly is:
= R(RO)

R(PCA)

R(PD) R(BCR) R(SAVL)

where:
R(HO)

= the reliability of the Hold-Off
Circuitry

R(PD)

= the reliability of the Paddle
Deployment circuitry

1)

a ground command can turn on the taper
charge mode of the Backup Charger and feed
the Operating Battery from the Backup Charger

2)

The operating and Standby Batteries are
interchanged automatically by the battery
selector switch or by the Ground Command
Modules Nos. 7 and 9. This operation also
requires successful operation of the Ground
Command Module No. 6 which switches the
Taper Charging Function to the new operating
battery.

3)

if both batteries are below the prescribed
level of charge, the emergency mode is in
itiated, or

4)

both the Operating and Standby Batteries are
brought on the line by the action of two
zener diodes when the line voltage drops
more than 12 volts below the highest terminal
voltage of the two batteries

R(BCR) = the reliability of the Battery
Charge Regulation function
R(SAVL)= the reliability of the Solar
Array Voltage limiter function
The Hold-Off and Paddle Deployment
functions are performed by series type electronic
circuitry. The reliability of the devices pro
viding these functions is represented by the
product of the reliabilities of the piece parts
that compose the devices. Therefore:
=

R(HO)

IT

Ri

1=1
and

where:

In the event of (3) or (4) above, taper charging
is supplied both batteries simultaneously by the
taper charger or the backup charger.

- TT

R(PD)

If the Trickle Charger fails, a ground command
must turn on the trickle charge mode of the Backup
Charger (assuming the Backup Charger is not then
feeding the Operating Battery) and feed the Standby
Battery from the Backup Charger.

R-j_ = the numerical reliability of the
ith piece part in the Hold-Off
circuitry
n

1

the Operating Battery State of Charge Monitor
the Taper Charger can be switched through the
Command Bypass Loop to the Operating Battery.
Taper Charger fails, or it both the State of
Monitor and the Ground Command Bypass Loop

Referring to Figure 9 9 the Battery Charge Regulation
function will be satisfactorily performed if the
Common Selector Logic does not fail, and if either:

= the total number of piece parts that
make up the Hold-Off circuitry

R. = the numerical reliability of the
jth piece part in the Paddle De
J
ployment circuitry
no = the total number of piece parts
in the Paddle Deployment circuitry
Figure 9 is the reliability diagram for
the Battery Charge Regulation function. The
Battery Charge Regulation function is provided
by a Taper Charger, a Trickle Charger, a
Backup Charger with both a taper and trickle
charge capability, two State of Charge Monitors
each associated with a particular spacecraft
battery, and a group of logic and switching
circuits. The Battery Charge Regulation
function is satisfactorily performed if the
Operating Battery (either Battery A or Battery
B) receives a taper charge and the Standby
Battery (Battery B or Battery A) receives a
trickle charge.

1)

The Taper Charger (1) charges the Operating
Battery either through the associated State
of Charge Monitor (2) , or through the Ground
Command Number One Bypass loop (12), or

2)

If the Ground Command Switch (4) turns on the
taper charge mode of the Backup Charger (3)
which then charges the Operating Battery

In addition, success has been assumed to imply that
a charge is maintained on the Standby Battery (see
assumption 1). Therefore, successful performance of the
Battery Charge Regulation function also requires that:

In the primary mode of operation the
Taper Charger feeds the Operating Battery
through its associated State of Charge Monitor
and the Trickle Charger feeds the Standby
Battery directly. Under these conditions,
the Backup Charger is maintained in a nonoperating standby status.

1)

The Trickle Charger (8) operates satisfactorily,
or that

2)

The Ground Command Switch (5) , the taper charger
(1) , and the trickle charge mode of the Backup
Charger (14) operate satisfactorily (see
assumption 5), or that

3)

The Emergency Mode functions properly or that

4)

The Battery Selection Mode does not fail

Proper operation of the Standby Battery implies that it
be charged to at least 50 percent of its capacity at
the time it is switched to Operating Battery status.
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Presently available information indicates that
a fully charged nickel-cadmium battery at the
maximum AOSO temperature of 110°F, under nocharge, no load conditions, will lose 50 per
cent of its charge in 42 days (1008 hours).
Therefore, the Standby Battery must receive
a trickle charge from the state of the mission,
until no more than 42 days before failure of the
Operating battery. If the primary trickle
charge mode (that is, if the Trickle Charger
itself) fails, the trickle charge mode of the
Backup Charger will be switched on and will
feed the Standby Battery. This assumes that it
is not already supplying the Operating Battery
(see assumption 5). The trickle charge mode
of the Backup Charger will then be required
to operate without failure from the time of the
failure of the Trickle Charger until no more
than 42 days before failure of the Operating
Battery.
Lack of information prevents the identifi
cation of the reliability distributions of the
AOSO batteries at this time. Even if this
information were available, the derivation of a
precise expression for the probability of suc
cessful performance of the trickle charger
function would require the summation of all
successful combinations of Taper Charger,
Trickle Charger, and Backup Charger success
and failure, along with conditional proba
bilities associated with the performance of the
Operating Battery over the time interval from
T = 0 to T' = t (end of mission). The result
is a very unwieldy set of integrals. In order
to eleviate this situation, it is specified
(see assumption 16) that either the Trickle
Charger or the trickle charge mode of the
Backup Charger must operate from the start of
the mission to within 42 days or 1008 hours
before the end of the one year mission time, t.
The resulting expression is conservative in that
it completely neglects all those combinations
of circumstances in which successful system
operation will result in spite of failure of
both the Trickle Charger and the trickle charge
mode of the Backup charger prior to t - 1008
hours or 7792 hours.

are considered equal in the development of the math
ematical model. The reliability, R(EM), of the
Emergency Mode is then the probability that either
the emergency mode circuitry (Rio) or its backup
circuitry (Rn) operates.

R(BS)

The reliability for the Emergency Mode is
essentially determined by the emergency mode
circuitry. There is, however, a backup for
this circuitry. The backup for the emergency
mode circuitry consists of two zener diodes which
cause both batteries to be switched on to the
main line whenever the line voltage drops more
than 12 volts below the highest of the two
battery terminal voltages. Because of the
different operating principles employed, this
backup system does not act to remove non-essential
loads from the line and will require a larger
time delay for operation. Therefore, the backup
system is not operationally equivalent to the
emergency mode circuitry, although these alternates

=

R6

1 - (1 - RaRaRcD) (1 - R7R9)

The reliability, R(BCR), of the Battery Charge
Regulation function can now be expressed as a function
of the respective reliabilities of the Common
Selector Logic, R(CSL), and of the devices involved
in the primary, backup, and emergency modes of
operation.
Let:
F

=

the probability of failure of the
primary charge mode in the time
period A t,

R(BCR)

=

the reliability of the Battery Charge
Regulation function

t

=

the total mission time of 8800 hours

RjL

=

the reliability of the ith device
in the Battery Charge Regulation.
function and i = 1, 2, 3, . . ,
corresponding to the numbering of
the blocks in Figure 9.

±2

=

the probability of failure of the
Operating Battery State of Charge
Monitor in the time period

R3(t-tTl) =

The Common Selector Logic shown in Figure 9
consists of two silicon controlled rectifiers
(SCR) . The reliability R(CSL) , of the Common
Selector Logic is merely the product of the
reliabilities for the SCR's.
2
R(SCR) i
| |
R(CSL) =
i = 1

1 - (1 - RIO) (1 - Rll)

R(EM)

The reliability of the battery selection mode
R(BS) is the probability that the Ground Command
Module No. 6 operates times the probability that
either the battery selection circuitry or the Backup
Ground Command Modules Nos. 7 and 9 operate. The
reliability of the selection circuitry is equal to
the probability, Rg, that both battery sensors
operate times the probability, Ra , that both sensor
modules operate, times the probability, R^DJ that
the C, C-j^, and D logic modules operate. Thus,

G

=

Rg(t-1008-t2)=

the probability of successful operation
of the Backup Charger from the time
of failure of the primary charge
mode,t^» to the end of the mission, t
the probability of failure of the
Trickle Charger in, the time period
the probability of successful operation
of the trickle charge mode of the
Backup Charger from the time of
failure of the Trickle Charger, ~t 2,
to t - 1008 hours
emergency mode reliability

R(EM)

=

R(BS)

-

battery selection mode reliability

R(CSL)

-

Common Selector Logic reliability

(Note assumption 12 regarding the time independence of
the switching devices (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), (12) )
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R(BCR)
^t

Then.

T) + R4 FR3 (t-ri)d
1
Rt

f t-1008
R5 J

the Driver Stage, and any four of the remaining
branch
seven branches operate satisfactorily. Each
are
is fused. Therefore, only "open" type failures
of
possible. To derive the mathematical model
let:
Stage,
Power
the
of
R(PS)
,
the reliability

(t-1008-

fl-R(BS)R R(CSL)
The Solar Array Voltage Limiter function is
provided by a difference amplifier, a driver
stage, and a power stage. Satisfactory perform
ance of the Solar Array Voltage Limiter function
requires that all three devices perform satis
factorily. Therefore, the general expression
for the reliability of the Solar Array Voltage
Limiter function, R(SAVL) , is:
R(SAVL)

R(DA)

=

R(DS)

r

=

the reliability of any one of the
nine parallel branches, and

q

=

the unreliability of any one of the
branches

Then the mathematical model is given by:

n3

R(PS)
R(SAVL)

where:
R(DA)

=

the reliability of the
Difference Amplifier

R(DS)

=

the reliability of the
Driver Stage

R(PS)

=

the reliability of the
Power Stage

Both the Difference Amplifier and the Driver
Stage are series type electronic circuits.,
The reliability model for each, device is,
es
therefore, simply the product of the reliabiliti
If:
of the piece parts that make up the device.
Rk

=

the reliability of the kth
piece part in the Difference
Amplifier, and

n~

-

the total number of piece
parts in the Difference
Amplifier, the reliability
model of the Difference
Amplifier is given by:

R(DA)

+ 7r 6 q

r 2 (r ?

R!(PS)=

-f 21r q 2 + 35r q3 ) .

in
Substituting the derived mathematical models
l
the general expression yields the mathematica
model for the reliability of the Solar Array
Voltage Limiter:

TT

IT*
t

r 2 (r 7

7r 6 q

21r q

35r4q3)

k=l
Summary:
In summary, the general expression for the
in terms
reliability of the power control assembly
by
of the reliability of the functions performed
the power control assembly equipment, is:
R(PCA)

R(HO) R(PD) R(BCR) R(SAVL)

Since:
R(HO)

the reliability of the Hold-off
circuitry

TT

V

a=l
R(PD)

•ft

the reliability of the Paddle
Deployment circuitry

-IT

k=l

R.,

Similarly, if:
= the reliability of the mth piece
part in the Driver Stage, and

R(BCR)

= the total number of piece parts
in the Driver Stage, the model
of the reliability, R(DS) ,
of the Driver Stage is given
by:
R(DS)

H-

TT
m=l

The power stage consists of nine parallel
a
branches, each comprising a transistor and
resitor. Proper operation of the Power Stage
by
requires that the first two branches be fed
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= the reliability of the Battery Charge
Regulation function

R(SAVL) = the reliability of the Solar
Array Voltage Limiter

where:
R = the reliability of the ith subassembly

*3

?,*
*•'

the reliability mathematical model of the
power control assembly is:

Model Use
System Reliability Prediction - The quantative analysis
consists of the evaluation of the mathematical models
derived above. In order to perform this evaluation, a
tabulation of part types, quantities, and failure rates
are made for each of the blocks in the reliability diagram.
This tabulated information permits the calculation of the
subassembly reliabilities which are then combined in the
manner prescribed by the reliability mathematical models.
The results of reliability predictions using the math
model developed above are shown in Table II.
Reliability Optimization - The results of above pre
diction indicated that the reliability of the conversion
assembly needed to be improved from 0.797 to 0.943. There
was also a strong indication that changes were needed
in system design philosophy.

The predicted reliability resulting from
the solution of the above model is the pro
bability that a taper charge and a trickle
charge will be available for an Operating
Battery and a Standby Battery, respectively,
for a period of 8800 hours in orbit. This is
a very conservative statement of the mission
problem, however, since all that is required
for AOSO
success is the ability to taper
charge either of the two batteries.
The model describing this latter problem
would not require that the Trickle Charge
Function not fail. Instead, a conditional
probability would be associated with the
requirement for the Trickle Charge Function
for mission success. Thus, (referring to
Figure 9 ) the taper charge function would be
directly connected to the Operating Battery
and the Trickle Charge Function, the Emergency
Mode, or the Battery Selection Mode would be
utilized only with the condition that the
Operating Battery fails. A reliability value
cannot be calculated from this latter model
at present, however, since nothing is known
about the probability of having to switch from
the Operating to the Standby Battery and, as
mentioned earlier, the accounting for the re
dundant batteries will take place in the over
all AOSO analysis performed by the prime con
tractor.
Power Conversion Assembly - The mathematical
model of the reliability of the Power Conversion
Assembly is relatively simple. There are 14
subassemblies that make up the Power Conversion
Assembly. All of these subassemblies must
operate properly if the Power Conversion
Assembly is to satisfy its requirements. There
fore, the reliability of the Power Conversion
Assembly is simply the product of the reliabil
ities of the 14 subassemblies. Mathematically,
this is expressed as
14
R(Power Conversion) =
T I
R-

First of all, it was readily apparent that preliminary
designers were somewhat overly concerned with being able
to perform and contrpl the battery charge and discharge
functions. This resulted a large number of separate
alternate modes of operation which, from the weight
viewpoint caused the assembly to be too reliable. This
meant that the control assembly could be simplified at a
saving in weight and volume which would be invested into
increasing the reliability of conversion assembly.
Another preliminary design concept requiring review
was the effort to -stay away from power supply switching
problems and very costly weight and volume penalties
which would be associated with the employment of redunancy
in the conversion assembly, The use of ultrareliable
Minutenian Project parts to negate the need for redundancy
was one of the main results of this concept. The
reliability prediction,, however, revealed that the
use of minuteman parts resulted in the conversion assembly
reliability being almost entirely a function of the
reliability of electrical connections. Further, it was
apparent that the failure rate of soldered or welded
connections would have to be decreased by two orders
of magnitude before the initial conversion assembly
configuration could meet the reliability requirements.
In order to determine what new concepts should be
adopted for the purpose of generating a design configur
ation with acceptable reliability, the system math model
was subjected to an optimization effort throughout the
design period. The initial procedures and results of
this effort are covered in reference 2.
The mathematical development and supporting theory
for the optimization procedures used on uower control
and conversion assemblies are contained in references 10,
12 and 13. In brief, these procedures permit simultaneous
consideration of n methods of subassembly reliability
improvement, such as different types of redundancy, and m
system parameters, such as weight and volume, in order
to select the optimum system configuration.
The governing analytical process consists of the
identification of the area of least reliability in the
system and the selection of the technique for increasing
the reliability of that area which is best with respect
to system parameters such as weight and cost. This
process is repeated with each new "least reliability
area" until an optimum system is achieved. The optimum
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system is that final system configuration in
which the reliability of the least reliable
area has been maximized to a degree which
assures satisfaction of the system reliabil
ity requirement without exceeding system
limits on parameters such as cost, weight
and volume.
Technical Management Decision Making - The
results of the reliability prediction and op
timization analyses were used throughout the
development effort on the power conversion and
control assemblies. Some specific instances
in which engineering and/or management deci
sions were based on these analyses are:
1.

The establishment of part procurement
requirements based on accurate
application information.

2.

The initiation of a circuit and
packaging redesign effort for the
purpose of minimizing electrical
connections.
The initiation of extensive engineer
ing and manufacturing investigation
which proved welded connections were
not needed thus saving the division
considerable funds.

4.

The selection and functional definition
of ground command and automatic with
ground command override switching
arrangements.

5.

The selection of items to undergo
stress-strength test to failure
investigation.

6.

The selection of simplified battery
charger designs.

Redundancy
3)

I. Bazovsky, "Reliability Theory and Practice",
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jerse'y
1961, pp 87, 97-126.

4)

U. S. Department of Defense, "Reliability Stress
and Failure Rate Data for Electronic Equipment"MIL-HDBK-217", U. S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1962, pp 231-248.

5)

Department of the Navy Bureau of Ships, "Navy
Reliability Design Handbook", U. S. Navy Bureau
of Ships, Washington, D. C., 1960, section 1.6,
change 10, pp 12-28.

6)

H. S. Balaban, "Some Effects of Redundancy on
System Reliability", Proceedings Sixth National
Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control,
January 11-13, 1960, pp 388-402.

7)

S. A. Weisberg, J.H.S. Chin, "Reliability and
Availability of Some Redundant Systems", Pre
sented at Maintainability Conference at
Hanscom Field, Bedford Massachusetts, March,
1963.

8)

G. Black & F. Proschan, "Optimal Redundancy",
Operations Research Journal, September 1959,
pp 581-588.

9)

B. J. Flehinger, "Reliability Improvement Through
Redundancy at Various System Levels", I.B.M.
Journal, Vo. 2, No. 2, April 1958, pp 148-158.

Optimization

10)

M. Sasaki, "A Simplified Method of Obtaining
Highest System Reliability", Proceedings of
Eighth National Symposium of Reliability and
Quality Control, January 9-11, 1962, 489-502.

11)

R. E. Barlow and L. C. Hunter "Criteria for
Determining Optimum Redundancy", I.R.E. Trans
actions on Reliability and Quality Control,
April, 1960, pp. 73-76,

12)

M. Sasaki, "An Easy Allotment Method Achieving
Maximum System Reliability", Proceedings Ninth
National Symposium on Reliability and Quality
Control, January 22-24, 1963, pp 109-124.

13)

L. R. Webster, "Choosing Optimum System Con
figurations", Proceedings Tenth National
Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control,
January 7-9, 1964, pp 345-359.

14)

J. A. Connor, "Reliability Predictions for
Multi-Mode Electronic Systems", Proceedings
Eighth National Symposium on Reliability and
Quality Control, January 9-11, 1962, pp.
516-519.

15)

Major H. A. Wilkes, "Operational Research A Prelude to Reliability", Proceedings Eighth
National Symposium on Reliability and Quality
Control, January 9-11, 1962, pp 516-519.

AOSO Summary
As a result of the conversion and
control assembly reconfiguration and design
improvement program, of which the reliability
optimization activities were a portion, the
configuration was improved as shown in
Table III.
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CONFIGURATION

RELIABILITY MODEL
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Item
Power Conversion

Required
Reliabilitv

Predicted
Reliabilitv

0.943

0.797

Power Control

0.971

0.989

Both
Assemblies
Combined

0.915

0.787

Item

Reliability
Requirements

"first cut1 " Parts Count
Prediction

.51

TABLE III

Conversion Assy.

0.943

Control Assy.

0.971

Combined

0.915

Initial
Prediction
0.797

Present
Prediction
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